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Into an analytical stock-flow consistent Post-Kaleckian distribution and growth model the 
following transmission channels of ‘financialisaton’ are integrated. 1. ‘Financialisation’ is 
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between capital and labour through a dividend-elastic mark-up in firms’ price setting in the 
medium run. 2. Firms’ investment is affected through a ‘management’s preference channel’ 
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finance-capital ratio is endogenised, and the medium-run stability and viability of the 
financial structure and of capital accumulation is checked. 
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1. Introduction 
We develop a simple analytical stock-flow consistent Post-Kaleckian distribution and growth 
model, which attempts to include some effects of ‘financialisation’, which can be understood 
with (Epstein, 2005, p. 3) as an ‘ (…) increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies’. Recently, some stock-flow consistent distribution and growth models integrating 
issues of ‘financialisation’ have been presented.
1 However, these models have not paid much 
attention to changes in distribution between capital and labour caused by changes in the 
financial regime and to the related macroeconomic effects via consumption and investment. 
Also instability problems regarding the financial structure of the corporate sector have been 
hardly addressed. Therefore, we attempt to present a simple model which tackles some of 
these issues. 
Into the model to be developed the following transmission channels of 
‘financialisaton’ are integrated. 1. ‘Financialisation’ is assumed to affect distribution between 
firms and rentiers in the short run, and distribution between capital and labour through a 
dividend-elastic mark-up in firms’ price setting in the medium run. 2. Firms’ investment is 
affected through a ‘management’s preference channel’ and an ‘internal means of finance 
channel’. 3. Consumption is influenced via distribution of dividends in the short run and via a 
reduction in the labour income share in the medium run. Most importantly, the development 
of firms’ outside finance-capital ratio is endogenised in order to check the medium-run 
stability and viability of the financial structure and capital accumulation in different potential 
accumulation regimes under the conditions of ‘financialisation’.  
 
                                                 
1 See Godley/Lavoie (2007, pp. 378-444), Lavoie (2008), Skott/Ryoo (2008a,b), Taylor (2004, pp. 272-278), and 
van Treeck (2009). For an overview see Hein/van Treeck (2008).   2
2. The basic model 
We assume a closed economy without economic activity of the state. Under given conditions 
of production, there is just one type of commodity produced which can be used for 
consumption and investment purposes. There is a constant relation between the employed 
volume of labour (L) and real output (Y), i.e. there is no overhead-labour and no technical 
change, so that we get a constant labour-output ratio (a). The capital-potential output ratio (v), 
the relation between the real capital stock (K) and potential real output (Y
v), is also constant. 
The capital stock is assumed not to depreciate. The rate of capacity utilisation (u) is given by 
the relation between actual real output and potential real output. The basic model can be 
described by the following equations. 
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Writing w for the nominal wage rate, we assume that firms set prices (p) according to a mark-
up (m) on constant unit labour costs up to full capacity output. Following Kalecki (1954, pp. 
17-18), the mark-up is determined by the degree of price competition in the goods market and 
by the relative powers of capital and labour in the labour market (equation 1). The profit share 
(h), i.e. the proportion of profits (Π) in nominal output (pY), is therefore determined by the 
mark-up (equation 2). The profit rate (r) relates the annual flow of profits to the nominal 
capital stock (equation 3). 
The pace of accumulation in our model is determined by firms’ decisions to invest, 
independently of saving, because firms have access to short-term (or initial) finance for 
production purposes supplied by a developed banking sector, not modelled here. We assume 
that long-term finance of the capital stock consists of firms’ accumulated retained earnings 
(E
F), long-term credit granted by rentiers’ households (B), and equity issued by the firms and 
held by rentiers’ households (E
R) (equation 4). Part of firms’ liabilities (B+E
R) is therefore 
held by ‘outsiders’ to the firm, i.e. rentiers’ households, whereas another part (E
F) is 
controlled by ‘insiders’, either by the management or by owner managers. Since in our model 
we assume prices in goods and financial markets to be constant – capital gains are hence 
omitted from the analysis –, we assume that rentiers are interested in short-run maximum   4
dividend and interest payments, whereas management favours long-term growth of the firm.
2 
The rentiers’ share in capital stock, the outside finance-capital ratio, is given by γ (equation 
5), whereas   denotes the accumulated retained earnings-capital ratio or the inside finance-
capital ratio (equation 6). We assume these ratios to be constant in the short run, but to be 
variable and hence to be endogenously determined in the medium run. 
φ
Total profits (Π) split into firms’ retained profits (Π
F), on the one hand, and dividends 
plus interest paid to rentiers’ households (R), on the other hand (equation 7). Interest 
payments to rentiers’ households are given by the rate of interest and the stock of debt, with 
the rate of interest as a distribution parameter being an exogenous variable for income 
generation and capital accumulation, mainly determined by monetary policies and risk and 
liquidity assessments of banks and rentiers, following the Post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ view 
of endogenous money and credit.
3 Dividend payments, given by the dividend rate and the 
stock of equity held by rentiers’ households, are also determined by the power struggle 
between rentiers (shareholders) and firms (management), with rentiers being interested in 
high dividends for income purposes and management being in favour of retained earnings for 
firms’ real investment and growth purposes. We omit the effects of rentiers’ portfolio choice 
from our considerations in order to simplify further analysis. In what follows we synthesise 
dividend and interest payments to rentiers and consider just one rentiers’ rate of return on 
bonds and equity (e), which together with the stock of equity and bonds held by rentiers 
determines rentiers’ income (equation 8). Rentiers’ rate of return is determined by the power 
struggle between managers and rentiers and is hence the crucial variable when it comes to the 
discussion of the effects of increasing shareholder power vis-à-vis management and labourers. 
                                                 
2 On the ‘owner-management-conflict’ within in the firm based on a microeconomic ‘growth-profit-trade-off’, 
see Crotty (1990), Stockhammer (2005-6), and Hein/van Treeck (2008). 
3 For a survey of the Post-Keynesian endogenous money approach and its implementation into Post-Keynesian 
models of distribution and growth, see Hein (2008a).   5
Changes in the rentiers’ rate of return may cause a change in the mark-up in firms’ 
pricing in incompletely competitive goods markets (equation 1), if the determinants of the 
mark-up are affected as well by the rise of shareholder power, in particular the degree of price 
competition in the goods market and the relative power of workers and labour unions in the 
labour market. In the face of increasing shareholder power, we consider the mark-up to be 
dividend-inelastic in the short run. But in the medium run, the mark-up is likely to become 
dividend-elastic because of decreasing price competition in the goods market associated with 
mergers and acquisitions and hostile takeovers in the corporate sector, and in particular 
because of weakened bargaining power of labourers caused by a policy of ‘downsize and 
distribute’ and increasing unemployment (Lazonick/O’Sullivan, 2000).
4 The profit share 
(equation 2) will hence become elastic with respect to the rentiers’ rate of return. 
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume a classical saving hypothesis, i.e. 
labourers do not save. The part of profits retained is completely saved by definition. The part 
of profits distributed to rentiers’ households, the interest and dividend payments, is used by 
those households according to their propensity to save (sR). Therefore, we get the saving rate 
(σ) in equation (9) which relates total saving to the nominal capital stock. In our model, we 
consider only rentiers’ consumption out of current income flows. Increasing stock prices and 
rising (stock market) wealth associated with ‘financialisation’ will further lower the overall 
saving rate, in particular when households can borrow extensively against collateral. 
However, this will be associated with increasing household debt which might feed back 
negatively on consumption.
5 These aspects are not modelled here. 
                                                 
4 For empirical results supporting this assumption, see Dumenil/Levy (2005), Epstein/Power (2003), and 
Epstein/Jayadev (2005). 
5 See the models by Bhaduri/Laski/Riese (2006), Dutt (2005, 2006), and Palley (1994).   6
The accumulation rate (g), relating net investment (I) to the capital stock, in equation 
(10) is based on the investment function proposed by Bhaduri/Marglin (1990).
6 Investment 
decisions are assumed to be positively affected by the rate of capacity utilisation and by the 
profit share, because both increase the (expected) profit rate. Distributed profits, the dividends 
and interest payments to rentiers, have a negative impact on investment, because they reduce 
retained earnings and firms’ own means of finance. This also limits the access to external 
funds in imperfect capital markets, according to Kalecki’s (1937) ‘principle of increasing 
risk’. 
Given shareholders’ desire for short-term profits – compared to management’s desire 
for long-term growth of the firm – increasing shareholder power vis-à-vis management will 
increase the rentiers’ rate of return and reduce available funds for real investment and growth 
of the firm. But increasing shareholder power will not only affect internal funds and thus 
firms’ finance constraints but also management’s preferences: Management’s ‘animal spirits’, 
reflected in the constant α in the investment function, will decline and might even become 
negative when managers are aligned with shareholders through stock option programmes and 
the threat of hostile takeovers in an active market of corporate control. Our investment 
function hence captures the two channels of transmission of increasing shareholder power on 
real investment, the ‘internal finance channel’ and the ‘management’s preferences channel’.
7
The goods market equilibrium is determined by the equality of saving and investment 
decisions (equation 11). The goods market stability condition requires that the saving rate 
responds more elastically to changes in capacity utilisation than capital accumulation does 
(condition 12). Our model thus generates the following goods market equilibrium values: 
 
                                                 
6 For an otherwise similar model with an investment generating the ‘stagnationist’ version of the Kaleckian 
distribution and growth model, which is more in line with the original ideas of Kalecki, see Hein (2008b). 
7 For empirical estimations of investment functions including these effects of rising shareholder power, see 
Stockhammer (2004), Orhangazi (2008), and van Treeck (2008a).   7
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In what follows, the effects of increasing shareholder power in an era of ‘financialisation’ on 
stable goods market equilibria only will be discussed. Increasing shareholder power will, 
firstly, affect management’s preferences and hence ‘animal spirits’ in the negative, and, 
secondly, it will be associated with an increasing rentiers’ rate of return. 
 
3. Short-run effects of increasing shareholder power 
For the discussion of the short-run effects of increasing shareholder power we assume γ and 
 to be given and constant. We also assume that firms are unable to shift increasing dividend 
payments to prices, because the determinants of the mark-up will change rather slowly. The 
mark-up and the profit share will therefore remain constant in the short run, too. 
φ
An increase in shareholder value orientation of management’s investment decisions, 
and hence a decrease in ‘animal spirits’, as indicated by α in the investment function, has 
uniquely negative effects on the endogenous variables. This is so, because ‘animal spirits’ 
display unambiguously positive relationships with the equilibrium rates of capacity 
















.   8
An increase in the rentiers’ rate of return, however, has ambiguous effects. It affects 
firms’ investment through the availability of internal funds and the access to external finance, 
but it also has an influence on the income of rentiers’ households and hence on consumption. 
With the outside finance-capital ratio, as well as the mark-up and the profit share, being 
constant in the short run, we obtain the following effects of a change in the rentiers’ rate of 
return on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation: 
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The effects of a change in the rentiers’ rate of return may be positive or negative, depending 
on the parameter values in the saving and investment functions of the model: 
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Assuming the stability condition (12) for the goods market equilibrium to hold implies for 





. Therefore, we get the following cases for the short-run equilibrium 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Short-run cases for a change in the rentiers’ rate of return 
  ‘Normal’ case  ‘Intermediate’ case  ‘Puzzling’ case 
  θ < − R s 1  
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< − < θ
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The ‘normal’ case of a negative impact of an increase in the rentiers’ rate of return on the 
equilibrium values of capacity utilisation, the profit rate and the rate of capital accumulation 
will be given if:  . Therefore, this case is the more likely the higher the rentiers’ 
propensity to save and the higher the responsiveness of firms’ real investment with respect to 
distributed profits and hence to internal funds. With this parameter constellation, the increase 
in consumption demand associated with redistribution of income from firms to rentiers’ 
households is insufficient to compensate for the negative effects on firms’ investment. In the 
‘normal’ case, the effect of an increasing rentiers’ rate of return on the equilibrium rates of 
capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation amplifies the negative effects of rising 
shareholder power via management’s ‘animal spirits’ on these variables and we obtain the 
overall ‘contractive’ regime (Table 2). 
θ < − R s 1
 
Table 2: Short-run accumulation regimes under the conditions of ‘financialisation’ and rising 
shareholder power 







weak/strong weak  weak 
Effect via rentiers’ rate 
of return  ‘normal’ case  ‘intermediate’ case  ‘puzzling’ case 
   10





s 1 R . A 
low propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, a low responsiveness of investment with 
respect to distributed profits and internal funds, and a high elasticity with respect to capacity 
utilisation allow for a positive effect of an increasing rentiers’ rate of return on the 
equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation. In the ‘puzzling’ 
case, the effect of an increasing rentiers’ rate of return on the equilibrium rates of capacity 
utilisation, profit and capital accumulation may over-compensate the negative effects of rising 
shareholder power via management’s ‘animal spirits’. If this condition holds, we will obtain a 
‘finance-led’ accumulation regime (Boyer, 2000), and hence an overall positive effect of 
increasing shareholder power on the rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital 
accumulation (Table 2). 
Finally, an ‘intermediate’ case may arise if: 
β
θ < − < θ
v
h
s 1 R . In this case, an increase 
in the rentiers’ rate of return is accompanied by rising rates of capacity utilisation and profit, 
but by a falling rate of capital accumulation. What is required for the ‘intermediate’ case, on 
the one hand, is a low rentiers’ propensity to save, which boosts consumption demand in the 
face of redistribution in favour of rentiers, and a low responsiveness of firms’ investment with 
respect to distributed profits and hence internal funds, which limits the negative effects of 
redistribution on firms’ investment. On the other hand, however, in the ‘intermediate’ case we 
also have a low responsiveness of investment with respect to capacity utilisation which, in 
sum, is not able to over-compensate the negative effects of a rise in the rentiers’ rate of return 
through internal funds. In the ‘intermediate’ case, the negative effects of increasing 
shareholder power via management’s preferences (‘animal spirits’) is compensated by the 
effects of a rising rentiers’ rate of return with respect to capacity utilisation and the profit rate, 
but the negative effect on capital accumulation is reinforced. For the former, it is again   11
required that increasing shareholder power is associated with a strong effect of the increase in 
the rentiers’ rate of return but with a low effect via management’s ‘animal spirits’. If these 
conditions hold, we will obtain a ‘profits without investment’ regime (Cordonnier, 2006) 
(Table 2). 
 
4. Medium-run equilibrium and stability 
In the medium run of our model, we have to take into account that firms may be able to shift a 
higher rate of return demanded by rentiers to prices and that the mark-up, and hence the gross 
profit share (including dividend and interest payments), may increase. Therefore, with a 






, and the labour income share will decrease in the 
face of a rising rentiers’ rate of return. 
In the medium run analysis, the effects of a change in the rentiers’ rate of return on the 
stocks of debt and equity held by rentiers, and hence on the inside and outside finance-capital 
ratios, have to be considered as well. Since  1 = φ + γ , it is sufficient to analyse the dynamics 
of γ. We do not consider households’ portfolio choice between bonds and equity in the face of 
relative changes in dividend and interest rates. On the one hand, this is to simplify the 
analysis, on the other hand, we hold that households’ portfolio choice seems to be dominated 
by institutional and historical factors which only change slowly in the course of time, despite 
short- and medium-run variations in the dividend rate (relative to the interest rate). Further on, 
changes in households’ portfolio decisions would only affect firms’ investment decisions in 
our model if firms’ internal means of finance were affected. But there is no effect via Tobin’s 
q or Kaldor’s valuation ratio in our investment function, different from other Post-Keynesian   12
stock-flow consistent approaches (Skott/Ryoo, 2008a,b; van Treeck 2009).
8 We doubt that in 
an era of ‘financialisation’ an increase in Tobin’s q triggered by increasing shareholder 
power, share buybacks, increasing dividend payments and enforced changes in management’s 
preferences should be considered to be causing rising real investment.
9 For these reasons it 
seems to be sufficient to treat the effects of changes in the rentiers’ rate of return on the 
outside finance-capital ratio, and then to analyse the related effects on capital accumulation. 
The accumulation of bonds and equity held by rentiers is given by rentiers’ income 
and the propensity to save out of this income: 
( ) ( ) B E e s B E
R
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If we assume that prices remain constant, which means that mark-ups and distribution may 
change but not the price level, the growth rates of the outside finance-capital ratio depends on 
the growth rate of outside finance and on the growth rate of the real capital stock. From 
equation (6) we get: 
()
()
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In medium-run equilibrium the endogenously determined value of γ has to be constant, hence 
0 ˆ = γ  has to hold. Introducing this condition into equation (18) and making use of equation 
(15) yields the following medium-run equilibrium value for the outside finance-capital ratio: 
                                                 
8 If these models do away with a strong coefficient on Tobin’s q in the investment function, ‘profits without 
investment’ (van Treeck, 2009) or even ‘contractive’ accumulation regimes are generated (Godley/Lavoie, 2007, 
pp. 378-444; Lavoie, 2008). 
9 Medlen (2003) provides empirical support for our doubts. According to his observations there was a positive 
correlation in the US (1968-2001) between Tobin’s q, on the one hand, and the relationship between mergers to 
new real investment, on the other hand. This is the exact opposite of what Tobin’s q would suggest, because a 
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. Starting from equations (18) and 
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Taking into account that we assume the goods market equilibrium to be stable, it follows for 
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Stability of γ requires a low rentiers’ propensity to save, a low responsiveness of firms’ 
investment with respect to distributed profits and internal funds, and a high elasticity with 
respect to capacity utilisation. This is tantamount to a positive relationship of the rate of 
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Most importantly, it has to be noted that medium-run stability of the outside finance-capital 
ratio requires a ‘puzzling’ case effect of a change in the rentiers’ rate of return on the short-
run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation, as can be seen in condition (15a’). 
 
5. Medium-run effects of ‘financialisaton’ and rising shareholder power 
We are now in a position to discuss the medium-run effects of a rising rentiers’ rate of return 
and decreasing management’s ‘animal spirits’. From equation (19) we obtain the following 
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For the evaluation of the effects of an increasing rentiers’ rate of return we have to distinguish 
the ‘medium-run stable’ from the ‘medium-run unstable’ case.  
For the stable case, in which  () 0
v
h
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In the medium-run stable case, the effect of a change in the rentiers’ rate of return on the 
outside finance-capital ratio depends on the initial value of the rentiers’ share in the capital 
stock.   15
In the medium-run unstable case, we have  () 0
v
h
s 1 R < θ − − β  and the inspection of 
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A change in the rentiers’ rate of return will have an adverse effect on the equilibrium outside 
finance-capital ratio, provided that ‘animal spirits’ (α) are not too strong and the effect of the 
profit share on firms’ investment is weak. 
Evaluating the effects of an increasing rentiers’ rate of return on the medium-run 
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation, we obtain from equation (18), in which the condition 
0 ˆ = γ  has to hold: 
e s * * g R = .            ( 2 1 )  
The effect of a rising rentiers’ rate of return on the medium-run equilibrium rate of capital 
accumulation, given the propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, is thus by necessity 







.           ( 2 1 a )  
This finding follows straight forward from the condition for medium-run equilibrium, which 
requires the constancy of γ and hence that capital stock has to grow at the same rate as the 
sum of debt plus equity held by rentiers’ households. An increase in dividend (and also in 
interest) payments to rentiers in relation to the capital stock therefore requires increasing   16
capital stock growth in order to obtain a medium-run equilibrium.
10 We call this medium-run 
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation the ‘warranted rate’ (g**), because it is the rate of 
accumulation which is required for the constancy of the outside finance-capital ratio. 
However, it is in no way guaranteed that the goods market equilibrium rate of capital 
accumulation will adjust to that rate. Our ‘warranted rate’ of accumulation is thus in a sense 
reminiscent of Harrod’s (1939) ‘warranted rate of growth’. However, in our case it is neither 
related to goods market equilibrium, nor to desired capacity utilisation, but to a constant 
financial structure of the firm sector. 
As shown above, under the condition of the short-run ‘puzzling’ case regarding the 
effects of a rising rentiers’ rate of return (15a’), the stability condition for the medium-run 
equilibrium outside finance-capital ratio (20’) is met. The goods market equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation will thus adjust to the ‘warranted rate’ when the rentiers’ rate of return 
increases, and the new medium-run equilibrium will be reached. This adjustment process may 
be disturbed but not prevented by the two additional effects of rising shareholder power in our 
model. 
First, in the short and the medium run, the negative effects of falling animal spirits 
associated with rising shareholder power reduce the positive impact of a rising rentiers’ rate 
of return on capital accumulation. Second, in the medium run, the mark-up and hence the 
profit share is assumed to be elastic with respect to the rentiers’ rate of return. This has an 
additional effect on the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation, as can be 
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10 Since an increasing rentiers’ rate of return also affects the value of the equilibrium outside finance-capital 
ratio, as shown above, the required increase in capital stock may initially not need to be proportionate to the 
increase in outside finance.   17
As can be seen from the second term in the numerator of equation (15c), the effect of an 
increasing profit share on capital accumulation may be positive or negative, depending on the 
relative importance of the rate of capacity utilisation and the profit share in firms’ investment 
decisions. If capital accumulation is profit-led, medium-run redistribution in favour of gross 
profits will give an extra push to the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation. If 
accumulation is wage-led, however, redistribution in favour of gross profits will reduce the 
short-run positive effect of a rising rentiers’ rate of return.  
If for one of these reasons the increase in capital accumulation following an increase 
in the rentiers’ rate of return is not sufficient to meet the increased ‘warranted rate’ in 
equation (21), the outside finance-capital ratio will grow according to equation (18), and this 
will push up the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation according to equation 
(15) and thus stabilise the system. Therefore, the conditions for the short-run ‘puzzling’ case 
are sufficient for medium-run stability of the ‘finance-led growth’ regime. 
Under the conditions of the short-run ‘normal’ and ‘intermediate’ cases, capital 
accumulation will fall when the rentiers’ rate of return increases and the new equilibrium will 
not be reached; the stability condition for medium-run equilibrium (20’) is not met. With the 
short-run ‘normal’ and ‘intermediate’ cases prevailing, which implies instability of the 
medium-run outside finance-capital ratio, the ‘waranted rate’ of capital accumulation in 
equation (21), therefore, contains a kind of Harrodian ‘knife-edge’ instability property 
(Harrod, 1939). However, this instability is not related to the actual and the goods market 
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation, as in Harrod, but to the goods market equilibrium 
rate of capital accumulation and the rate of accumulation required for a constant outside 
finance-capital ratio. If the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation in equation 
(15) by accident is equal to the ‘warranted rate’ in equation (21), capital stock will keep on 
growing at that rate. But any deviation from the ‘warranted rate’ will cause exploding   18
deviation from this rate. If the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation falls 
short of the ‘warranted rate’, the outside finance-capital ratio will rise, according to equation 
(18), and this will feed back negatively on capital accumulation, according to equation (15), 
making capital accumulation fall further below the ‘warranted rate’ and the outside finance-
capital ratio rise further above the equilibrium rate. If the goods market equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation exceeds the ‘warranted rate’, the outside finance-capital ratio will fall 
(equation 18), and this will feed back positively on capital accumulation (equation 15), 
making it diverge even further from the ‘warranted rate’, and so on. The medium-run 
cumulative disequilibrium process will hence be characterised either by rising outside 
finance-capital ratios and falling rates of capital accumulation, or it will show decreasing 
outside finance-capital ratios and increasing rates of capital accumulation. We therefore attain 
a ‘paradox of outside finance’ reminiscent of Steindl’s (1976, pp. 113-122) ‘paradox of 
debt’.
11 Falling (rising) rates of capital accumulation induce firms to attempt to reduce (raise) 
the outside finance-capital ratio, but the macroeconomic effects of such a behaviour is that 
this ratio will increase (fall). 
In the ‘contractive’ and the ‘profits without investment’ regimes, an increase in the 
rentiers’ rate of return shifting the ‘warranted rate’ upwards will thus trigger a cumulatively 
downward process of the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation and a 
cumulatively upwards process of the outside finance-capital ratio. A decrease in 
managements’ animal spirits associated with rising shareholder power will exacerbate this 
process. Redistribution at the expense of labour in the medium run via the dividend-elastic 
mark-up will also reinforce this process if accumulation is wage-led, and it will dampen it 
without being able to prevent it, if accumulation is profit-led. 
                                                 
11 On the ‘paradox of debt’ see also Dutt (1995) and Lavoie (1995).   19
Finally, we have to examine the effects of falling management’s ‘animal spirits’ 
regarding real investment. From equation (19) we obtain for the effect of ‘animal spirits’ on 
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In the medium-run stable case, in which  () 0
v
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. Falling ‘animal 
spirits’ associated with rising shareholder value orientation will hence increase the 
equilibrium outside finance-capital ratio. Medium instability implies  () 0
v
h






. Decreasing ‘animal spirits’ will thus shift the (unstable) equilibrium outside 
finance-capital ratio downwards. 
For the effects of ‘animal spirits’ on the medium-run ‘warranted rate’ of capital 






.           (21b) 
Since the ‘warranted rate’ of capital accumulation required for a constant outside finance-
capital ratio is determined exclusively by rentiers’ saving out of dividend and interest 
payments relative to the capital stock, changes in management’s ‘animal spirits’ have no 
effect on this rate. A change in animal spirits will only affect the goods market equilibrium 
rate of capital accumulation. As discussed above, this will exacerbate cumulatively diverging 
processes of the goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation from the ‘warranted 
rate’ in the medium-run unstable case, and it will modify, but not prevent the adjustment 
process in the medium-run stable case. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
We can now summarise the effects of ‘financialisation’ in our Post-Kaleckian distribution and 
growth model. For our purposes, ‘financialisation’ has been understood as meaning increasing 
shareholder power vis-à-vis management and labourers, causing lower management’s ‘animal 
spirits’ regarding real investment and a higher rentiers’ rate of return in the short run, and a 
falling labour income share in the medium run. Summarising the main findings in Table 3, we 
distinguish between short- und medium-run effects, between a stable medium-run equilibrium 
and an unstable one, and between ‘contractive’, ‘profits without investment’ and ‘finance-led 
growth’ regimes. The short-run equilibrium condition is assumed to be fulfilled in any case. 
In the parameter constellation generating the medium-run stable case and a ‘finance-
led growth’ regime, we obtain that decreasing management’s ‘animal spirits’ have a negative 
effect on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation in the 
short run. These negative effects, however, are over-compensated by the positive effects of an 
increasing rentiers’ rate of return, provided that increasing shareholder power is associated 
with a relatively weak decline in management’s ‘animal spirits’. In the medium run, the mark-
up and the profit share will increase, and the equilibrium outside finance-capital ratio will 
rise, fall or even remain constant, depending on the initial values of this ratio. The effect of a 
rising rentiers’ rate of return on the medium-run equilibrium rate of capital accumulation, on 
the ‘warranted rate’, is positive. And since we are dealing here with a stable equilibrium 
outside finance-capital ratio, the ‘warranted rate’ of capital accumulation has therefore to be 
stable, too, because it has been derived from the constancy condition for the outside finance-
capital ratio. Changing ‘animal spirits’ have no effect on the medium-run equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation (the ‘warranted rate’) but only affect the equilibrium outside finance-
capital ratio in an adverse way, i.e. the medium-run equilibrium value of this ratio will rise in 
the face of falling management’s ‘animal spirits’.   21
 
Table 3: Short- and medium-run effects of ‘financialisation’ and rising shareholder power 
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From this it follows that a ‘finance-led growth’ regime, which is characterised by high 
or rising rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation in the face low ‘animal 
spirits’ and a high and rising rentiers’ rate of return, may be a viable regime, not only in the 
short but also in the medium run. However, the ‘finance-led growth’ regime and a medium-
run stable outside finance-capital ratio require a special parameter constellation: a low 
rentiers’ propensity to save, a low elasticity of investment with respect to distributed profits 
and hence to internal funds, a high responsiveness with respect to capacity utilisation, and a 
weak effect of a change in ‘animal spirits’ on investment. 
In the probably more realistic parameter constellation yielding the medium-run 
unstable case and the ‘profits without investment’ or the ‘contractive’ regimes,
12 the short-run 
negative effects of rising shareholder power on the real equilibrium via management’s 
preferences are reinforced by the effects of an increasing rentiers’ rate of return with respect 
to capital accumulation. The effects of the increasing rentiers’ rate of return on the short-run 
equilibrium rates of capacity and profit may be negative, which will then give the short-run 
‘normal’ case and the ‘contractive’ regime. Or they may be positive and over-compensate the 
negative effect of increasing shareholder power via management’s ‘animal spirits’, and the 
short-run ‘intermediate’ case and the ‘profits without investment’ regime are obtained. In the 
medium run with a rising mark-up and an endogenously determined outside finance-capital 
ratio, a rising rentiers’ rate of return reduces the equilibrium outside finance-capital ratio, 
provided managements ‘animal spirits’ are weak and the effect of unit profits on investment is 
not too strong. A rising rentiers’ rate of return increases the medium-run equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation, the ‘warranted rate’. The depressing effect of rising shareholder power 
on management’s ‘animal spirits’ reinforces the diminishing effect of the rising rentiers’ rate 
of return on the equilibrium outside finance-capital ratio.  
                                                 
12 Empirical analysis for the US (van Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt, 2007; van Treeck, 2008b) and the estimations by 
van Treeck (2008a) suggest that the US has been dominated by a ‘profits without investment’ regime since the 
early 1980s.   23
In the medium-run unstable equilibrium, the equilibrium values of the outside finance-
capital ratio and of the rate of capital accumulation in the ‘profits without investment’ and the 
‘contractive’ regimes will only be attained by a fluke. If by accident the economy is in such 
an equilibrium, the effects of rising shareholder power – via falling ‘animal spirits’ and a 
rising rentiers’ rate of return – will probably reduce the equilibrium outside finance-capital 
ratio and surely increase the ‘warranted’ rate of capital accumulation. The actual value of the 
outside finance-capital ratio will then exceed its new equilibrium value, whereas the actual 
rate of capital accumulation will fall short of the respective new ‘warranted rate’. We will 
hence see a disequilibrium process with rising outside finance-capital ratios and falling rates 
of capital accumulation which reinforce each other. The medium-run equilibrium, therefore, 
displays ‘knife-edge’-instability properties and the disequilibrium process contains a ‘paradox 
of outside finance’.  
Of course, this is not to argue that economies with a ‘profits without investment’ or a 
‘contractive’ regime are cumulatively unstable, because there may be other forces in the 
economy at work (in particular monetary and fiscal policies) which contain this instability. 
However, based on the results of our simple model, we would argue that under the conditions 
of the ‘contractive’ and the ‘profits without investment’ regimes there is a considerable 
systemic medium-run instability potential regarding the financial structure of the economy 
and capital accumulation. Therefore, a regime of ‘profits without investment’ in the face of 
rising shareholder power, as observed in the US since the early 1980s, may emerge under 
specific conditions. In the medium to long run, however, the financial structure of this regime 
and the rate of capital accumulation will turn out to be fragile and unstable. 
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